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 Summary
Shortly aft er the appearance of the 
Illyrian program in Zagreb, it received an 
enthusiastic response from Bosnia. Several 
Franciscans from Bosnia hoped for the li-
beration from the Ottoman rule and they 
gave faith to the state that would spread 
from Adriatic to the Black sea. Th is idea, 
a “voice of fairy”, disturbed the spirits and 
opened path to radical changes. Inspired 
by this Franciscan Franjo Jukić in May of 
1850 wrote a letter to Sultan Abdulmejid. 
In it he voiced “the wishes and pleas of 
Christians in Bosnia-Herzegovina”. Jukić 
claimed that Christians should not be tre-
ated as lower class citizens, but as equal citizens of the Ottoman Empire. Th ere 
was no response to his wishes and pleas, but the Ottoman authorities, con-
fronted with internal and external events and developments tried, at least to a 
certain degree, to modernize its administration and to initiate social reforms. 
Th is led to a big resistance and rebellion of conservative Moslem captains in 
Bosnia. Aft er a long period of crisis, lawlessness and violence, in Dračevo near 
Gabela in Herzegovina, on June 19, 1875, a revolt against the Ottoman aut-
horities began. It was led by a Catholic priest Don Ivan Musić. Th e rebellion 
quickly spread, announcing the end of a centuries long Ottoman rule of Her-
zegovina and Bosnia. Th e rebellion echoed throughout Europe, especially in 
Serbia, Montenegro and in the Croatian lands. Th e demands of those who 
started the rebellion can be summarized in a sentence of their message to the 
diplomats of the European states: “We only demand to have right to live as 
humans, and to as animals as were are considered by the Turks. We demand 
autonomy”. Th ey wanted to achieve with weapons what Franciscan Franjo 
Jukić was not able to achieve with his letter. Th e rebellion transformed the 
“Eastern question” into the “Eastern crisis”. Fierce battles ensued, as well as 
the suff ering of the civilian population, followed by the diplomatic attempts to 
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solve the crisis. In summer of 1878 Austro-Hungarian troops entered Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. Austro-Hungarians thought that their troops will not be 
opposed, but in fact they were met with resistance and suff ered considerable 
losses. Th e Ottoman authorities respected the decision of the Berlin congress, 
but local fanatical Moslem religious leaders did not. Faced with the unfavo-
rable development of events, the Ottoman diplomacy, just prior to the Berlin 
congress, off ered the European powers to allow the Austro-Hungary to occu-
py Herzegovina, while Bosnia would remain under Ottoman control. But the 
Austro-Hungarian minister of foreign aff airs Andràssy rejected this, deeming 
such proposal as unacceptable and as a solution that would lead to “multiple 
confl icts”. During the fi nal days of the congress representatives of the Otto-
man empire were able to gain secret concession from the Austro-Hungarian 
diplomats, whose and according to this Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bo-
snia-Herzegovina was declared as a provisional solution, while the Sultan wo-
uld retain the sovereignty over both lands. Th e convention signed in Istanbul 
on April 21, 1879 agreed that Moslem would, during their Friday’s prayers, 
mention the name of Sultan, while the Ottoman banners would be held at the 
mosques. In Catholic churches, sermons were celebrating the Austro-Hun-
garian emperor whose black-yellow banners hold back the national fl ags. Th e 
Orthodox glorifi ed the Russian emperor who was granting them his protecti-
on. Generally, situation in the former Ottoman province Bosnia and Herze-
govina were developing in the direction of the solving of the national question 
- the main dilemma was – who would be, among the empires, be the superior 
force – Austro-Hungarian, Russian or Ottoman. Confessional, in the meanti-
me already national elites (at least among Catholics/Croats i Orthodox/Serbs) 
had particular interests. Th eir views about the future were diff erent, they di-
ff erently saw the contemporary situation and they had diff erent memories of 
the past.  
Shots fi red in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914 rang out through Europe and 
announced the war that would completely change the fates of individuals and 
positions of whole nations and states. During that war several solutions were 
off ered for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Shortly aft er the outbreak of war, in Autumn 
of 1914, Oskar Potiorek, Austro-Hungarian general and governor of Bo-
snia-Herzegovina, suggested the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina between Au-
stria and Hungary. According to this proposition, Austria would have acqu-
ired Herzegovina with Prozor, Glamoč, Livno, Duvno and Bugojno (without 
Donji Vakuf) and part of territory near river Drina, because it was a border 
area with Serbia. What remained would have be under the Hungarian admi-
nistration. But Potiorek’s proposal was not accepted because Austrian and 
Hungarian representatives were not able to fi nd agreement about this questi-
on. But these two dominant nations within the dual monarchy did not care 
about the demands of less numerous nations within the Monarchy. Both Au-
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strians and Hungarians insisted on their maximalists demands until the end. 
But the processes initiated by the World War I also led to new demands. In 
August of 1917 Moslem representatives made the “most energetic objection” 
against any kind of South-Slavic union and they demanded from the emperor 
and king Charles to establish “autonomous Bosnia-Herzegovina”. During that 
same period Croatian representatives demanded the establishment of a uni-
ted administrative unit that would include the territories of Croatia, Slavonia, 
Dalmatia, Herzegovina and Bosnia, and it was also seen as a desirable solution 
to include Istria and Slovenian province Krain. Serb representatives waited for 
the end of the war and aspired to unite with Kingdom of Serbia. Th e political 
strategy of the authorities of Kingdom of Serbia was clear from the contem-
porary statement among their diplomats: “Th e whole wisdom is to tie one’s 
boat to a right ship and then to take care for it not to get untied”. With the 
changes at the battlefronts, the attitude of the Croatian political elites toward 
the dual monarchy also underwent modifi cations. Th ere were new ambitions 
and, along with them, new identities. What was once “the solution of state 
question at the south of dual monarchy according to Croatian wishes” tran-
sformed itself into a support for the creation of a particular South-Slavic state. 
Th e defeat in the Great War and fear of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia 
caused the breakup of Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. When the Austro-Hun-
garian troops occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina, bishop Juraj Strossmayer said 
that the dual monarchy will follow the fate of the Ottoman Empire, because 
it will collapse and disappear from the historical scene. His statement ultima-
tely became a wise prophecy. First and the foremost reason for such ultimate 
fate of Austro-Hungarian Empire, as Strossmayer wrote, will be “the egoism 
and ambitions of the two dominant nations, that have caused the animosity 
among Slavic nations whose demands and interests were completely ignored”. 
In the chaotic conditions of war, all sides had their plans and ambitions. Hun-
garians made maps that included parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina and ultimately 
they lost the two thirds of the territory they had under their administration 
and large number of ethnic Hungarians ultimately remained living outside 
the borders of the new Hungarian state. Once great and powerful Austria also 
suff ered territorial losses and humiliation. A new period was coming, marked 
with injustice, violence and dictatorship. Serbian unitary and centralists poli-
cies, as well as Yugoslav idea, endangered the survival of the Croatian national 
identity. Th e idea of the American president Woodrow T. Wilson about the 
“right of nations for self-determination”, that constituted the policy of US de-
legation at the peace negotiations, gave strength to numerous national move-
ments, including those in south-eastern Europe. But it was very questionable 
how the idea about self-determination would be put to practice. Wilson him-
self was not clear about what are the nations and which one of them should 
have the right to “self-determine”. He himself admitted that he did not even 
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know about the existence of various European nations that demanded their 
rights.
Once an Austro-Hungarian “pincer” whose purpose was to eliminate 
the possibility of unifi cation of South-Slavic states, Bosnia-Herzegovina in 
new circumstances became the backbone of South-Slavic, Yugoslav move-
ment and the center of gathering of South-Slavic states. Th e Serbian army 
entered Sarajevo on November 6, 1918, demonstrating the Serb victory and 
supremacy that would last for a long time. Th ree ethnic Serbs from Bo-
snia-Herzegovina who were members of the Yugoslav committee led extre-
mely Greater-Serbian and anti-Croatian policy. Th ey advocated the united 
Bosnia-Herzegovina solely because they believed that this is the solution that 
would prevent the creation of the Croatian state. In fact, Bosnia-Herzegovina 
became the center of what would became the Yugoslav space and “knot” that 
had to prevent and kind of an agreement and peaceful split between Croats 
and Serbs, meaning the separation and independence for Croats. Many, and 
especially Yugoslav communists, would later do a lot to make that “knot” as 
tangled as possible in order to secure the stability and long term survival of 
the Yugoslav state. Moslem political elites believed in the particular role and 
importance of Bosnia-Herzegovina for the Yugoslav state and what is even 
more probable – they saw the Yugoslav idea as a tool in preservation of Bo-
snia-Herzegovina. Yugoslav Moslem Organization was formed in February 
1919 and this political party proclaimed the acceptance of the “upgradable 
nationalism” and Yugoslav idea as the most appropriate road to “convergence 
and unity”. Its representatives thought that Croatian nationalism is bound 
with the Catholicism and Serb nationalism with Orthodox faith, therefore 
both of these nationalisms were inaccessible for Moslems. Th erefore, they 
accepted Yugoslav idea because it was “not mixed with any other infl uen-
ce”. But with the creation of the new Yugoslav state and the establishment of 
its authority, Bosnia-Herzegovina was no more place of gathering. Instead it 
became a scene of national and political confrontation between Croats and 
Serbs. In such circumstances, the elites of Moslems of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
were ready to opt for the side that was willing to take into consideration the-
ir demands and to fulfi ll their interests. Th e element is such strategy was 
constant fl irtation with either Serb of Croatian side, in order to make the 
Moslem element as important as possible.
Th e assassination of Croatian representatives in the Yugoslav parliament 
in June of 1928 heralded the breakup of Yugoslav idea and state. Th e dicta-
torship and repression that ensued only accelerated this. Vladko Maček con-
tinued the struggle of Stjepan Radić for Croatian national interests and at 
all the ensuing parliamentary elections he managed to secure the support of 
the greatest majority of Croatian people. Moslems mostly supported Mehmed 
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Spaho and Yugoslav Moslem Organization, while Serb voters opted for Yugo-
slav unitary or Serb national programs, although they were, in fact, diffi  cult 
to distinguish. It is very diffi  cult to assume how this type of political struggle 
would have developed, had the possibility of a new major war confl ict had 
not appeared. Just before the outbreak of World War II, the Serb political eli-
te, aware of the instability and divisions within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, 
decided to make an agreement with Croats. In late August of 1939 Banovina 
Hrvatska was established as a Croatian autonomous unit within Yugoslavia. 
It seemed that Yugoslavia would be able to withstand the temptations that 
followed. Moslem political elite was not satisfi ed with such solution. Spaho 
died just before the mentioned changes and was succeeded by Džafer Kule-
nović. Already in September of 1939 Kulenović demanded the establishment 
of an autonomous Bosnia-Herzegovina. He claimed that such unit would re-
present “a miniature small Yugoslavia that would attract all forces from all 
areas of our homeland and would, as such, strengthen the Yugoslavia as a 
whole”. Th erefore, according to Kulenović, an autonomous Bosnia-Herzego-
vina would present “a binding knot of this state, it would gather to itself both 
Serbs and Croats and it would be the pivot of Yugoslavism and its idea as a 
state”. Such opinion was supported by some Serb politicians. Nevertheless, 
this caused the fi erce reaction of the majority of Serb political representatives 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina that was strongly against the establishment of Bano-
vina Hrvatska, because they thought that this is an initial step in breakup of 
Yugoslavia and that the Croatian autonomous unit gained too much territory.
In its modern history Bosnia-Herzegovina was called and considered a 
“pincer”, a “hearth of movement”, a “clasp between Croats and Serbs”, a “bin-
ding knot of the state”, a “Mini-Yugoslavia” by various political factors and 
options. But it was always just an element in someone’s wider projects, a tool 
for achieving some higher goal.
During World War II Bosnia-Herzegovina became part of Independent 
State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH) under the Ustasha re-
gime. It again became the battlefi eld where the fate of its three nations had 
to be decided. Croats to a large degree accepted NDH, because they believed 
that it represents the fi nal liberation from foreign dominance. Th ey saw it as 
a fulfi lment of old aims and as a fi nal form of national freedom. Shortly aft er 
the proclamation of NDH Serbs began with the uprising whose aim was either 
the reestablishment of Yugoslavia, or the creation of their own national state – 
colloquially called “Greater Serbia”. Th e Ustashe regime proclaimed Moslems 
as “Croats of Islamic faith”, as a “blood of our blood” and as s “fl ower of our 
Croatian nation”. Th e larger part of Moslem elites accepted NDH, hoping to 
achieve better position than the own in the former Kingdom of Yugoslavia. As 
the time passed, such hopes were replaced by disappointment and aft er years 
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of struggle and violence there appeared a wakeup call. In the storm of war all 
were looking to tie their boat to a ship that would sail them to safety. Croats 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina had no option, and they had no boat to salvation eit-
her. Th ey boarded the German raft  that would, ultimately, be crushed at the 
Austrian and Slovenian mountains with terrible losses at the end of World 
War II. Serbs were able to board three diff erent boats – the fi rst was tied to 
German, the second to British, and the third to Russian, in fact a Soviet ship. 
In the meantime, they also went along the Italian ship, before it ultimately was 
capsized. When it became visible who would be the ultimate winner, Serbs 
in large number boarded the winning boat. Moslems also chose the tactics 
of simultaneously supporting various factions. In early October of 1942 they 
demanded the exclusion of Herzegovina from NDH and its annexation to 
Kingdom of Italy. In November of 1942 a group of infl uential representatives 
of Yugoslav Moslem Organization send a “memorandum” to Adolf Hitler, de-
manding the establishment of an autonomous “County of Bosnia” that would 
be excluded from NDH and put under the direct rule of German Reich. In 
early April of 1943 Amin al Husseini, grand muft i of Jerusalem, visited Saraje-
vo and was welcomed with full honors. His message to the local Moslem com-
munity can be summarized in the following sentence: “You must always bear 
in mind, that the biggest enemies of Islam and of us Moslems in this world are 
England and America joined with Jews”. Aft er this visit a massive mobiliza-
tion of Moslems into 13th SS voluntary Bosnian-Herzegovinian division was 
initiated. Th is division was known as “Handjar division”. In autumn of 1944, 
when the fi nal outcome of was well known, there came a massive “reorienta-
tion” od Moslems who started joining the rank of the Partisan army. Already 
before few Moslems, infl uential because of their pro-Yugoslav and pro-Serb 
views, had joined the ranks of Partisans led by the Communist Party of Yugo-
slavia. Moslem political elite to a large degree accepted the reestablishment of 
the Yugoslav state under the communist regime. Th eir support was particu-
larly motivated by the fact that People’s Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was 
established as one of the six republic within the Federative People’s Republic 
of Yugoslavia. All “auxiliary boats” were in the meantime sank into oblivion 
and many of their passengers, even those who were killed as the members of 
the defeated armies, were – according to the needs of national “reorientation” 
– rehabilitated and proclaimed to be “antifascists” and patriots. Yugoslavism 
and self-managing socialism became the new framework for the growth of the 
new Moslem elite. Within this framework Moslems were in 1968 recognized 
as an equal Yugoslav nation. All this was achieved through a large degree of 
agreements between Moslem communists, nationalists and Islamists. Occasi-
onal ideological confl icts between these groups and individuals did not harm 
such general agreement and did not put to question the main goals of their co-
operation. In nearly half a century of Yugoslav and communist indoctrination 
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a large part of Moslem elite accepted all its main traits. All this would later 
infl uence the intra-ethnic relations and the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Th e basis of intra-ethnic tensions and struggles during World War II was 
not in the ideological questions – fascism or anti-fascism, but in the state and 
national questions. Th e main dilemma was – Croatia or Yugoslavia, Croatian 
nationalism versus Yugoslav and Serb national ideas. At the end of World War 
II and in its immediate aft ermath, Yugoslav communists organized and con-
ducted a massive repression and execution of prisoners of war and all of their 
real or potential enemies. Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina were especially 
targeted in this wave of revolutionary and nationalist violence. Beside the fact 
that a large number of Catholic priests from Bosnia-Herzegovina was execu-
ted or imprisoned, in Herzegovina and in some parts of Bosnia every third 
adult Croatian man (averagely 23 years old) was killed. Th ose were the main 
reasons why Croats, to a large degree, were never able to accept Yugoslavia 
and the communist regime.
Th e breakup of communist regimes in Europe opened the path of demo-
cratization in Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the fi rst free, general 
democratic and multiparty elections in the history of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
held in November of 1990, the ruling communists suff ered defeat. Th ree na-
tional parties won the elections and gained all seven seats in the Presidency 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as 84% of seats in its parliament. Th e results of 
the elections represented the national structure of population of Bosnia-Her-
zegovina. National identities and national politics gave legitimacy to the new 
authority. But such new democratically elected authority could only function 
in stability with the mutual respects, recognition of identity and legitimate 
interests of others. Readiness for compromise was a prerequisite for any furt-
her step. But it soon became obvious that it was not easy to achieve this. For 
Serb Democratic Party only acceptable solution was for Bosnia-Herzegovina 
to remain within Yugoslavia, while Croatian Democratic Union did not want 
to remain in Yugoslavia. Moslem Party of Democratic Action advocated Bo-
snia-Herzegovina as a state of “citizens”, meaning the centralized and unitary 
state that would in fact be the “national state” of Moslems. Ultimately the 
war broke out and took away lives of 100 000 people, destroying the complex 
fi ber of society of Bosnia-Herzegovina. During that war, similarly as through 
history, three collective groups, Millets, religious communities, ethnic-confe-
ssional groups, people, nations – led their battles for their particular interests. 
During this struggle they made temporary alliances, depending on situati-
on and balance of power. Serbs counted on the support of Yugoslav People’s 
Army to achieve their goals and they try to do this, which makes them most 
responsible for the war. Moslem political leadership made clear that it would 
not sacrifi ce “sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina” for peace, in fact that Moslems 
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would lead war for Bosnia-Herzegovina as “state of citizens”. Th is meant that 
they saw Bosnia-Herzegovina exclusively as a centralized state, in fact a sta-
te of Moslems. Croats supported Bosnia-Herzegovina as long as it remained 
independent from Yugoslavia. Th ey were the only party that accepted all in-
ternational peace plans and accepted all solutions that were off ered in order 
to stop the war. War between Croats and Moslems was caused primarily be-
cause of the Moslem political goal to establish Bosnia-Herzegovina as their 
national state, which was also aimed at bringing to fi nalization the establish-
ment of the Moslem nation. Croats tried to preserve their identity and politi-
cal position by all means. Th e war between Croats and Moslems was marked 
with suff ering, destruction and victims, but during an important humanita-
rian action was launched and it, to a large degree, helped to fi nish this war. 
During the war between Croats and Moslems, Croatian doctors showed all 
their skills, ability to organize, they showed their readiness to sacrifi ce and, 
last but not least, they showed their humanism. Th ey gave medical attention 
to Croatian, but also to enemy soldiers and civilians and they distinguished 
themselves with the humanitarian action called “White road to Nova Bila and 
Bosna Srebrena”. Th ey secured humanitarian help for around 70 000 Croats, 
among them 12 000 children, who were living in encirclement of Moslem for-
ces. Th ese Croats were target of attacks of overwhelming Moslem forces. In 
such circumstances the Church of Holly Spirit in Nova Bila was turned into 
an improvised hospital. Th e Church was a place of prayer and at the same 
time hospital for the wounded and ill. Th e humanitarian action called “White 
road to Nova Bila and Bosna Srebrena” broke the media blockade and showed 
to the public, both in Croatia and across the world what is really going on in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Humanitarian volunteers who took part in this action 
found themselves under attack and when humanitarian convoy was returning 
from his mission a driver of a truck, Ante Vlaić from Split, was killed. Th e 
humanitarian action “White road to Nova Bila and Bosna Srebrena” was, in 
a way, a pinnacle of 150 years long connection between Zagreb and central 
Bosnia, between the people who have, even in the most diffi  cult historical 
circumstances, had identical values and identical Croatian national identity.
